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How to Contradict an Expression of Intention∗
John Schwenkler
If I say I am going for a walk, someone else may know that this is
not going to happen. It would be absurd to say that what he knew
was not going to happen was not the very same thing that I was
saying was going to happen.
Nor can we say: But in an expression of intention one isn’t saying
that anything is going to happen! Otherwise, when I had said ‘I’m
just going to get up’, it would be unreasonable later to ask ‘Why
didn’t you get up?’ I could reply: ‘I wasn’t talking about a future
happening, so why do you mention such irrelevancies?’ (G. E. M.
Anscombe, Intention (2nd ed.), p. 92)
1 Introduction
This chapter presents a novel interpretation of G. E. M. Anscombe’s discussion
in Section 31 of Intention of the relationship between expressions of intention
and descriptions of matters of fact.1 I begin in section 2 by drawing out what
is uncontroversial in the passage under consideration, namely that according to
Anscombe an expression of intention in a statement like “I’m raising my arm”
or “I’m going to get up at seven o’clock”, which on its face offers a description
of what is happening or is going to happen, is contradicted only by an opposing
command or the expression of an opposing intention. Having clarified this much,
I then ask: How should we interpret this claim, and what is its place in the
broader argument of Intention?
Section 3 considers a response to these questions that reads Anscombe as
saying that the truth of a statement expressing an intention is independent of
whether the intended action is actually performed. I argue that this interpreta-
tion is no good, as it stands in tension with too much of what Anscombe says
in her book, especially her insistence that the expression of one’s intention in
∗I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 2015 Tennessee Values and Agency
Conference, and learned a lot from the audience there. Thanks also to the FSU graduate
students in my Fall 2016 seminar on Intention, and especially to Marshall Bierson, Jimmy
Doyle, Jeremy David Fix, Christopher Frey, Jennifer Frey, Kim Frost, Eric Marcus, Beri
Marušić, Niels van Miltenburg, Candace Vogler, and an anonymous referee with OUP for
valuable feedback and discussion.
1The interpretation is no longer quite novel, since between writing this chapter and revising
it for publication I outlined the same interpretation, though in less detail, in Schwenkler (2019,
106-111).
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acting also expresses practical knowledge of what happens when one acts. In
section 4 I then offer an alternative interpretation of the passage that makes
equally good sense of the text while avoiding this problematic conclusion. The
key, I’ll argue, is to see that Anscombe is speaking only of what contradicts
expressions of intention, and that everything she says is compatible with what
she insists on many times elsewhere, namely that an expression of intention
describes the world in a way that will be contrary to, and so incompatible with,
any opposing statement of fact.
2 The Passage
To begin, here is the passage in question:
What is the contradictory of a description of one’s own inten-
tional action? Is it ‘You aren’t, in fact?’—E.g. ‘You aren’t replen-
ishing the house water supply, because the water is running out of
a hole in the pipe’? I suggest that it is not. To see this, con-
sider the following story, which appeared for the pleasure of readers
of the New Statesman’s ‘This England’ column. A certain soldier
was court-martialled (or something of the sort) for insubordinate
behaviour. He had, it seems, been ‘abusive’ at his medical exam-
ination. The examining doctor had told him to clench his teeth;
whereupon he took them out, handed them to the doctor and said
‘You clench them’.
Now the statement: ‘The water is running out of a pipe round
the corner’ stands in the same relation to the statement ‘I’m replen-
ishing the house water-supply’ as does ‘My teeth are false’ to the
order ‘Clench your teeth’; and so the statement (on grounds of ob-
servation) ‘You are not replenishing the house water-supply’ stands
in the same relation to the description of intentional action ‘I am
replenishing the house water-supply’, as does the well-founded pre-
diction ‘This man isn’t going to clench his teeth, since they are false’
to the order ‘Clench your teeth’. And just as the contradiction of
the order: ‘Clench your teeth’ is not ‘The man, as is clear from the
following evidence, is not going to do any clenching of teeth, at least
of the sort you mean’, but ‘Do not clench your teeth’, so the con-
tradiction of ‘I’m replenishing the house water-supply’ is not ‘You
aren’t, since there is a hole in the pipe’, but ‘Oh, no, you aren’t’ said
by someone who thereupon sets out e.g. to make a hole in the pipe
with a pick-axe. And similarly, if a person says ‘I am going to bed at
midnight’ the contradiction of this is not: ‘You won’t, for you never
keep such resolutions’ but ‘You won’t, for I am going to stop you’.
(I, pp. 54-55)
Though the text is almost impossibly dense, it’s easy enough to see what
Anscombe is claiming about the relations between statements like those in the
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three groups shown in Table 1. In each case, the first statement is either a
command (in Group 1) or the expression of an intention (in Groups 2 and 3)
to act in a certain way. The same goes for the third statement, though here
what is commanded (in Group 1) or intended (in Groups 2 and 3) is the op-
posite of what the first statement commands or expresses an intention to do.
Finally, the second statement in each group differs from the first and third in
being what Anscombe elsewhere calls an estimate of what is happening or is
going to happen: in saying these things the speaker expresses a judgment (that
he won’t clench his teeth, that the water-supply isn’t being filled, that someone
won’t go to bed at a certain time) that would be justified by reasons “suggesting
what is probable, or likely to happen” (I, p. 4). And Anscombe’s claim is that
the contradiction of the first statement ineach group is not the second, but the
third: in general, a command or expression of intention is contradicted only by
an opposing command or the expression of an oposing intention, rather than by
an opposing estimate.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
“Clench your teeth.” “I’m replenishing thehouse water-supply.”
“I am going to bed at
midnight.”
“My teeth are false
(and so I cannot clench
them).”
“The water is running
out of a pipe round the
corner (and so the
water you are pumping
is not getting to the
house).”
“You won’t go to bed at
midnight, for you never
keep such resolutions.”
“Do not clench your
teeth.”
“Oh no, you aren’t”
(said by someone who
sets out to make a hole
in the pipe running to
the house).
“You won’t go to bed
at midnight, for I am
going to stop you.”
Table 1: The three groups of statements considered in Section 31.
It will help to have a formalism on hand to represent these distinctions, since
as we can see already there is a great variety of ways to express both intentions
and estimates of matters of fact, some of which are liable to be confused for
members of the other category—as in one of Anscombe’s best examples:
... if I say ‘I am going to fail in this exam’ and someone says ‘Surely
you aren’t as bad at the subject as that’, I may make my meaning
clear by explaining that I was expressing an intention, not giving an
estimate of my chances. (I, pp. 1-2)
Here, a statement that is heard at first as an estimate of how the speaker is
going to do turns out to have been an expression of intention: and so the way
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to contradict what the speaker says is not by giving a different estimate of her
chances, but rather with the expression of an intention to prevent her from
failing, or a command that she do what is needed to pass. This shows that the
very same sentence can be used sometimes to give a command or express an
intention and other times to express an estimate: the difference between these
kinds of speech act isn’t always evident in syntax. For our purposes, therefore,
it will help to adopt the following convention:
(C) Let “EST(...)” abbreviate the estimate that a certain thing is happening, or
is going to happen, and “INT(...)” abbreviate the command or expression
of intention to do the thing described.2
Following (C), the original statement in Anscombe’s test example will be writ-
ten as “INT(I am going to fail this test)”, and the mistaken interpretation of it
as “EST(I am going to fail this test)”—the INT and EST operators are silent,
as it were, in ordinary speech, and this is what creates the potential for confu-
sion, though in most cases it’s clear enough from context and intonation which
category a given statement falls into.
This proposal raises some questions. One has to do with the fact that com-
mands often have an imperatival form rather than a propositional one: for ex-
ample, “Clench your teeth!” or “Take this patient to the operating theatre.”3 By
contrast, the form of an estimate is necessarily propositional. Given this, what
ensures that there is a single description that can both say what is commanded
and figure in an estimate of whether the command is going to be obeyed? In
fact there is a straightforward answer available, which is that for any command
there must be courses of action that would count as doing or failing to do what
is commanded, and so grasping a command must involve a grasp of what these
courses of action are.4 It is this grasp that is in the background of statements
like “Okay, I’ll do it” and “No I won’t!”, which express the intention to obey or
disobey the command precisely by giving a description of what one will do. And
it is just for this reason that commands, like expressions of intention, can have
the outward form of descriptions of future happenings—as when a parent tells
her child “You are going to clean your room this evening”, or in another great
example of Anscombe’s:
... when a doctor says to a patient in the presence of a nurse ‘Nurse
will take you to the operating theatre’, this may function both as
2To be clear, nothing in this formalism commits us to viewing commands as a kind of
expression of intention.
3For the latter example see Intention, p. 3. As I note just below Anscombe’s own for-
mulation of this command is different, and serves to illustrate just the point I mean to make
here.
4Admittedly this can be complicated in cases where a command is addressed to several
people. (I thank an anonymous referee for this observation.) For example, if I tell my children
all to clean their rooms, but only two of them do so, then has my command been obeyed?
A full treatment of this question would require distinguishing the case where several people
are commanded to do something together, from the case where each is commanded to do
something separately from the others. And this would require reflecting on the distinction
between joint and merely co-incidental action. On the last distinction, see Laurence (2011)
and Rödl (2018).
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an expression of his intention (if it is in it that his decision as to
what shall happen gets expressed) and as an order, as well as being
information to the patient; and it is this latter in spite of being in no
sense an estimate of the future founded on evidence, nor yet a guess
or a prophecy; nor does the patient normally infer the information
from the fact that the doctor said that; he would say that the doc-
tor told him. This example shows that the indicative (descriptive,
informatory) character is not the distinctive mark of ‘predictions’ as
opposed to ‘expressions of intention’, as we might at first sight have
been tempted to think. (I, p. 3)5
A more difficult question about this proposal is whether the difference that is
marked in (C) by the operators EST(...) and INT(...) should be read as a
difference in the kind of attitude that is expressed by a given statement, or in
the content of this attitude, or both.6 The analysis I’ve just given may suggest
a way of arguing that estimates, commands, and expressions of intention all
express attitudes that can share a common content: this will be the proposition
that such-and-such a person is doing, or is going to do, such-and-such a thing
(at an appropriate time). But a difficulty for this position is that intention
seems to be an essentially first-person attitude, and command an essentially
second-personal act, and there are powerful arguments for denying that self-
consciousness and address can be understood as special ways of relating to the
same proposition that can also be grasped from a third-person perspective.7
Since I find these arguments convincing I am inclined to reject the claim of
shared content, though it will be crucial to what follows this rejection must be
compatible with thinking that, in virtue of the logical connections between the
truth- and satisfaction-conditions of these different statements, the same reality
that is describable third-personally in estimates of what is happening or is going
to happen can also be taken up in self-conscious expression and in second-person
address: so any difference in content between them cannot mean that these acts
all have different subject-matters. To say otherwise would be to fall prey to the
very dualisms that Anscombe is trying to get us to resist.
5Anscombe adds two paragraphs later: “Execution-conditions for commands correspond to
truth-conditions for propositions. What are the reasons other than a dispensable usage for
not calling commands true and false according as they are obeyed or disobeyed?” (I, p. 3).
6Here I am grateful again to an anonymous referee.
7On the first person, see Anscombe (1981b), Doyle (2018), and Rödl (2007). On address,
see Haase (2014). Notice that this problem will arise even if some intentions concern the
actions of other people (on which see Ferrero (2013)), and some commands have a third-
person form (as in the example given just above, perhaps). While in Marušić and Schwenkler
(2018, 331-333) I defended a construal of intention as having a propositional content, I no
longer think this is required for a defense of cognitivism about intention, though I cannot
pursue the issue here.
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3 Infallibilism
All of the above will be uncontroversial in the interpretation of Section 31. The
further bit of interpretation that I do think should be controversial, and that
I’m going to challenge here, takes it to support the attribution to Anscombe
of what I’ll call an infallibilist conception of practical thinking, or thinking
about what one is doing or is going to do. I’ll begin this section by discussing
Anscombe’s conception of the knowledge of action, and explaining how the
infallibilist conception might be thought to resolve some of the difficulties that
arise in connection with it. I’ll then explore how the passage from Section 31
can be read as an argument in support of this position. Finally, I’ll argue that
Anscombe wasn’t an infallibilist at all, so this passage shouldn’t be read along
these lines. The following section will offer a different reading in place of it.
3.1 The infallibilist reading of Section 31
To see what’s at stake in interpreting Section 31, we need to recall its broader
context. Anscombe had proposed three sections earlier to “look more closely
into the formula which has so constantly occured in [her] investigation: ‘known
without observation’” (I, p. 49). That phrase occured first in Section 6, in
the course of Anscombe’s discussion of the conditions under which the question
“Why are you doing that?”, asked in a sense which seeks to discover the agent’s
reasons for acting, fails to have application to the action it concerns. Two of
these conditions are, first, when a person did not know that she was acting in
the way in question, and, second, when a person knew that she was acting in
this way “only because [she] observed it” (I, p. 14): in either of these conditions,
Anscombe argues, the question “Why?” lacks application, from which it is sup-
posed to follow that the action in question was not intentional. This argument
is taken to yield one of Anscombe’s best-known doctrines, that an action is in-
tentional under a given description only if the agent knows without observation
that she is acting in this way—and it is this doctrine that, beginning in Section
28, she means to defend.8
The challenges in upholding this doctrine are obvious enough. How can it
be that a person knows without observation whatever she is intentionally doing,
including under descriptions that characterize her action in terms of what is
happening at a great distance from her body? Consider the example from
Section 23 that Anscombe recalls in the passage we have been considering:
A man is pumping water into the cistern which supplies the drink-
ing water of a house. Someone has found a way of systematically
contaminating the source with a deadly cumulative poison whose ef-
fects are unnoticeable until they can no longer be cured. The house
8In Schwenkler (2019, 189-191) I criticize this argument on the grounds that the statement
“I didn’t know that p” has the implication that one had no idea of the fact in question: so the
proper conclusion to draw is only that a person who is doing something intentionally must
either know or believe, in a way that is not grounded in observation, that she is doing the
thing in question.
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is regularly inhabited by a small group of party chiefs, with their
immediate families, who are in control of a great state; they are
engaged in exterminating the Jews and perhaps plan a world war.—
The man who contaminated the source has calculated that if these
people are destroyed some good men will get into power who will
govern well, or even institute the Kingdom of Heaven on earth and
secure a good life for all the people; and he has revealed the calcu-
lation, together with the fact about the poison, to the man who is
pumping. The death of the inhabitants of the house will, of course,
have all sorts of other effects; e.g. that a number of people unknown
to these men will receive legacies, about which they know nothing.
(I, p. 37)
If Anscombe is right, then the man operating the pump must have non-observational
knowledge of what he is doing under all the descriptions under which his action
is intentional: so the man must know without observation not just that he is
moving his arms and operating the pump, but also that he is sending water
through the pipes, filling the cistern with poisoned water, and so on. And the
challenge is to explain how the man can know all these things except through
his observation of what is happening, given the possibility that (e.g.) there may
be a hole in the pipe, which the poisoned water is flowing out of before it can
reach the party chiefs’ cistern.
It’s against the background of these difficulties that the infallibilist con-
ception of practical thinking can begin to seem attractive. Put simply, if the
problem is that a person’s beliefs about what she is doing can seem false or un-
justified in certain circumstances, especially in the absence of an observational
basis, then a natural response is to construe those beliefs as having a special
character that means they can’t be false or unjustified, at least not as easily as
beliefs of other sorts can be. This general strategy is familiar from philosophi-
cal work in other domains of first-person authority, where the self-ascription of
mental states is sometimes treated as having a self-verifying or “constitutive”
status; here, the idea is that something similar can be said about a person’s
thought about what she is intentionally doing.9
To make this strategy work, however, we need an explanation of why this
thought should be seen as secure from error in the way required. And this
is where the argument of Section 31 can seem relevant. As we have seen,
Anscombe’s claim there is that a statement of the form “I am doing A”, where
this expresses the speaker’s intention to act in this way, is not contradicted by a
statement made on the basis of evidence that the original statement was false:
thus the fact that there is a hole in the pipe carrying water relates to the man’s
statement that he’s replenishing the water-supply “as does the fact that the man
has no teeth of his own to the order ‘Clench your teeth’; that is, we may say
that in the face of it his statement falls to the ground, as in that case the order
falls to the ground, but it is not a direct contradiction” (I, pp. 56-57). On this
9For a reading of Section 31 along these lines, see Hubbs (2016). For sympathetic discussion
of “constitutivist” views of self-knowledge in the psychological domain, see Coliva (2012).
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reading, since the description of what one is intentionally doing has the form
INT(I am doing A) rather than EST(I am doing A), this description can be
true even in those circumstances where EST(I am doing A) is false, and this
guarantees those descriptions the kind of infallibility needed to resist the threat
to Anscombe’s doctrine of non-observational knowledge.
3.2 Why the infallibilist reading cannot be correct
So much for the infallibilist reading of Section 31. While I think it is attractive
in certain respects, not least in how it offers a straightforward way to make
sense of this very difficult passage, I am going to argue now that it cannot be
correct.
The first reason for this is narrowly textual. Though there are a few places
in Intention, the discussion of “contradictories” in Section 31 among them,
where Anscombe may seem to flirt with an infallibilist conception of practi-
cal thinking,10 there are many more places where she very clearly rejects this
idea, claiming instead that the truth-conditions of expressions of intention are
linked straightforwardly to those of corresponding estimates. The following are
the most relevant examples of this:
1. “... if I don’t do what I said [I was going to do], what I said was not true
(though there might not be a question of my truthfulness in saying it).
But ... this falsehood does not necessarily impugn what I said. In some
cases the facts are, so to speak, impugned for not being in accordance with
the words, rather than vice versa.” (I, pp. 4-5)
2. “Say I go over to the window and open it. Someone who hears me moving
calls out: What are you doing making that noise? I reply ‘Opening the
window’. I have called such a statement knowledge all along; and precisely
because in such a case what I say is true—I do open the window; and that
means that the window is getting opened by the movements of the body
out of whose mouth those words come.” (I, p. 51)
3. “... if nothing guarantees that the window gets opened when I ‘opened
the window’, equally nothing guarantees that my toe moves when I ‘move
my toe’; so the only thing that does happen is my intention; but where
is that to be found? I mean, what is its vehicle? ... And if the intention
has no vehicle that is guaranteed, then what is there left for it to be but
a bombination in a vacuum?” (I, p. 52)
10The most difficult case is the paragraph in Section 45 beginning “Orders, however, can be
disobeyed ...” (I, p. 82). There is much that could be said about this passage, but even if we
took it all at face value and as expressive of Anscombe’s own position, the position it supports
is not the infallibilist one that an agent’s description of her action can be true despite her
failing to do what she says, but rather one on which practical knowledge can be non-factive,
such that it can remain knowledge “even though what it [is] knowledge of [is] not the case”
(ibid.). It is, however, impossible to believe that Anscombe could have thought this. For
further discussion of this passage see Schwenkler (2019, 184-187).
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4. “The case that we now want to consider is that of an agent who says what
he is at present doing. Now suppose what he says is not true. It may be
untrue because, unknown to the agent, something is not the case which
would have to be the case for his statement to be true; as when, unknown
to the man pumping, there is a hole in the pipe round the corner.” (I, p.
56)
5. “... is there not possible another case in which a man simply is not doing
what he says? As when I say to myself ‘Now I press Button A’—pressing
Button B—a thing which can certainly happen. This I will call the direct
falsification of what I say.” (I, pp. 56-57)
6. “If I say I am going for a walk, someone else may know that this is not
going to happen. It would be absurd to say that what he knew was not
going to happen was not the very same thing that I was saying was going
to happen.” (I, p. 92)
7. “In saying ‘I am going to [do something]’, one really is saying that such-
and-such is going to happen ... which may not be true.” (I, p. 93—ellipsis
in the original text)
All these remarks except the third concern examples of what in Section 31
Anscombe calls the “description of one’s own intentional action”, and in each of
them Anscombe says that such a description will be false, or at least untrue or
not expressive of knowledge, unless the truth-conditions of the corresponding
“estimative” descriptions are satisfied. Nor are these remarks mere sidenotes:
rather they are just what Anscombe needs to say if she is to insist, as she
does for example in the second and sixth remarks above, that the object of an
agent’s practical knowledge is something that also can be known “from without”
by someone who observes what she does.11 That is, the problem with the
infallibilist reading is not just that it’s at odds with what Anscombe says in
these particular passages, but the way it opposes an idea that is absolutely
central to the argument of Intention, namely that what we know when we know
what we are intentionally doing is something that’s not just mental, but physical,
too—i.e., that the knowledge a person has “in intention” of what she is doing
is a knowledge of what is happening when she acts, under all the descriptions
under which what is happening is part of her intentional activity. This is an
idea that Anscombe emphasizes consistently in in response to the challenge that
she poses to herself in Section 28:
11This position is encapsulated in the notoriously difficult formula, “I do what happens” (I,
p. 52). It also falls out of Anscombe’s observation in Section 4 that intentional action can
be observed, so that chief among “the sort of things you would say in a law court is [sic] you
were a witness and were asked what a man was doing when you saw him” are the things that
the man would have been doing intentionally—i.e., those things which the man himself “could
say he was doing, perhaps even without reflection, certainly without adverting to observation”
(I, p. 8). Saying this requires denying that intentional action is private in the way that the
infallibilist conception seems to entail. I thank Jennifer Frey for helping me to see how this
point bears on my argument here.
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‘Known without observation’ may very well be a justifiable formula
for knowledge of the position and movements of one’s limbs, but you
have spoken of all intentional action as falling under this concept.
Now it may be e.g. that one paints a wall yellow, meaning to do so.
But is it reasonable to say that one ‘knows without observation’ that
one is painting a wall yellow? And similarly for all sorts of actions:
any actions that is, that are described under any aspect beyond that
of bodily movement. (I, p. 50)
It’s after raising this challenge that Anscombe says the things quoted in (2) and
(3) above, and rejects what she calls the “false avenue of escape” of saying “that I
really ‘do’ in the intentional sense whatever I think I am doing” (I, p. 52)—and
so the point of these passages leading up to Section 31 is precisely to rule out
the strategy of separating the content of an agent’s practical knowledge from
what happens in the material world. Against this suggestion, she insists that
in acting intentionally “I do what happens” (I, p. 52), and so my knowledge of
what I am doing is knowledge of my outwardly observable act. It is on these
grounds that the rejects the idea that “there must be two objects of knowledge”
corresponding to the two ways of knowing in question—observer’s and agent’s;
“one by observation, the other in intention” (I, p. 57). Rather, Anscombe’s view
is that there is one thing that can be known in both of these ways, and that
thing is an event or process in the material world. And the reading of Anscombe
as an infallibilist loses sight of this, since on that reading a person can know
“in intention” that she is doing something even when the right sort of happen-
ing isn’t present for the corresponding observational or otherwise “estimative”
knowledge to be possible. If this were true, then the fact of such a happening
wouldn’t be contained in the agent’s knowledge of what she is doing, as that
knowledge would be too independent of what actually happens.12
In raising these objections to the infallibilist reading I do not mean to deny
that Anscombe takes there to be something distinctive in the kind of error
involved in sincere but mistaken statements about what one is doing or is going
to do. When this happens, she says, we have a case where “the facts are, so to
speak, impugned for not being in accordance with the words, rather than vice
versa”:
This is sometimes so when I change my mind; but another case of it
occurs when e.g. I write something other than I think I am writing;
as Theophrastus says (Magna Moralia, 1889b 22), the mistake here is
12As I have argued elsewhere (see Schwenkler (2011, 140-141 and 2019, 182-183)),
Anscombe’s insistence on this point also undermines the strategy of defending her position
by appeal to the openness and broadness of the progressive tense. Though it’s true that, for
example, I can be running a mile even if I am right now bending down to tie my shoe, and be
crossing the street even if a bus hits me before I make it to the other side, if it were always
possible to salvage in this way the truth of the statement that I am doing such-and-such then
my knowledge of what I am doing would be prone to collapse in on itself. (“I am raising
my arm; it’s just that I’m paralyzed and so it happens not to be going up.”) For a defense
of Anscombe that seems vulnerable to this objection, see Thompson (2011). For a similar
criticism, see McDowell (2013).
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one of performance, not of judgment. There are other cases too: for
example, St. Peter did not change his mind about denying Christ;
and yet it would not be correct to say that he made a lying promise
of faithfulness. (I, pp. 4-5)
Anscombe reiterates this distinction at the end of Section 31, saying of her case
where “a man is simply not doing what he says” that here
... the mistake is not one of judgment, but of performance. That
is, we do not say: What you said was a mistake, because it was
supposed to describe what you did and did not describe it, but:
What you did was a mistake, because it was not in accordance with
what you said. (I, p. 57)
These remarks are important, and I’ll return to them below, but they do not sup-
port the interpretation of Anscombe as an infallibilist about practical thought.
Rather, Anscombe’s distinction between mistakes of judgment and mistakes of
performance evidently rests on the obvious idea that there is such a false or
untrue, but still sincere, statement of what one is doing or is going to do, and
is part of an alternative diagnosis of the distinctive kind of mistake or error
involved in such cases.13 Nowhere in this diagnosis do we find her saying that
an expression of intention can be true when a corresponding estimate would not
be.
4 Practical contradiction
So far I’ve introduced and then argued against the infallibilist reading of Section
31 of Intention, on the grounds that the position it ascribes to Anscombe is
deeply un-Anscombean. The present section will explain how else I think we
should understand Anscombe’s talk of “contradiction”.
The key to my alternative reading is a distinction between two forms of
logical opposition that Aristotle identifies in the De Interpretatione:
I call an affirmation and a negation contradictory opposites when
what one signifies universally the other signifies not universally, e.g.
‘every man is white’ and ‘not every man is white’, ‘no man is white’
and ‘some man is white’. But I call the universal affirmation and
the universal negation contrary opposites, e.g. ‘every man is just’
and ‘no man is just’. So these cannot be true together, but their
opposites may both be true with respect to the same thing, e.g.
‘not every man is white’ and ‘some man is white’. (De Int. VII,
17b16-25)
In this passage, Aristotle is distinguishing the relations between propositions of
the following four forms:
13For a similar point see McDowell (2010, 429-430).
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(A) Every S is F.
(E) No S is F.
(I) Some S is F.
(O) Not every S is F.14
As Aristotle observes, while propositions of form (A) are logically opposed to
ones of (E) as well as ones of form (O), these two kinds of logical opposition
are different: specifically, corresponding (A)-form and (O)-form propositions
are such that it’s impossible for both members of such pair to be true or for
both members to be false; whereas with corresponding (A)-form and (E)-form
propositions it’s only impossible for both to be true at once, while both can
be false if the corresponding (I)-form and (O)-form propositions hold. Aristotle
calls the first kind of opposition that of contradictories, and the second that of
contraries: a pair of statements are contradictories if the truth of each entails
the falsehood of the other and vice versa; and mere contraries if the truth of
each entails the falsehood of the other, but the falsehood of each is compatible
with the other’s falsehood or truth. Finally, propositions in the form of (I)
and (O) are said to be the subalterns of those in the former of (A) and (E),
respectively, since the truth of the former follows from that of the latter and
the falsity of the latter from that of the former, while (I)-form and (O)-form
propositions relate to one another as subcontraries, since they can both be true
but cannot both be false. These relations are laid out as a truth-table in Table
2.
A E I O
A: Every S is F. T F T FF T or F T or F T
E: No S is F. T F F TF T or F T T or F
I: Some S is F. T T or F F T or FF F T T
O: Not every S is F. T F T or F T or FF T F T
Table 2: Logical relations among the four Aristotelian propositional forms.
The suggestion I want to make about Section 31 is that Anscombe’s use
of the language of “contradiction” and “contradictory” is an invitation to recall
these Aristotelian distinctions, and that in saying that it is INT(~p), rather
than EST(~p), that is the contradiction of INT(p) she invites the thought that
the second of these judgments is contrary to the last, in that it’s impossible for
both to be true at the same time. This reading makes good sense of Section
31 while also remaining consistent with the many passages quoted above where
14On the proper formulation of Aristotelian (O)-form propositions, see Parsons (2021).
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Anscombe clearly depicts INT(p) and EST(~p) as logically opposed, even as
standing in “a kind of contradiction”: that kind of contradiction, I suggest, is a
practical form of Aristotelian contrariety, which is not the same as the “head-on”
contradiction found in “pairs of contradictory orders, contradictory hypotheses,
or opposed intentions” (I, p. 92).
It will be clear that the distinction between contradiction and contrariety
that I’m reading into Section 31 can’t be just the same as the traditional distinc-
tion deriving from Aristotle, not least because it doesn’t map onto the distinc-
tion between universal and non-universal propositions. Yet it’s plausible that
a similar distinction should be drawn here: just as Aristotelian contradictories
are such that each denies exactly what the other says, and nothing more or less,
so it is with Anscombean ones, as here each is of the same “logical order” as the
other, expressing something directly opposed to what the other one does.15
Can we push the parallel further than this, toward an account of the logical
relations between estimates, commands, and expressions of intention that’s sim-
ilar to Aristotle’s account of the relations between his four propositional forms?
The discussion above suggests that such an account would need to respect at
least the following constraints:
• First, the statements EST(p) and EST(~p) are like Aristotelian contra-
dictories in being both exclusive and exhaustive: if either member of the
pair is true it follows that the other member is false, and likewise if either
member of the pair is false it follows that the other is true.16
• Second, the pairs INT(p) and EST(p), on the one hand, and INT(~p) and
EST(~p), on the other, are rather like the Aristotelian “subalternating”
pairs (A)/(I) and (E)/(O): the truth of the second member of each pair
follows from that of the first member, and likewise if the second member
of either pair is false then the first member must be false as well, but the
truth of the second member is compatible with either the truth or the
falsity of the first one.
• Finally, INT(p) and INT(~p) should stand to one another at least in the
relation of Aristotelian contraries: the truth of each will entail the falsity
of the other.
It remains to consider what follows from the falsity or non-satisfaction of com-
mands and expressions of intention. As far as the corresponding estimates are
concerned it seems clear that nothing at all should follow: for example, if you
tell me to leave my dishes on the table and I do leave them there, I may have
either have followed your order or refused it but left them there because I had
15For this use of “logical order”, see Haddock (2011, 158).
16Questions might be raised about the status of statements about the future: if there is as
yet no fact as to whether a certain thing is going to happen, then can’t EST(It will happen)
and EST(It won’t happen) both be false? I cannot address this question here, though a more
plausible claim would be that the truth-value of these statements is indeterminate in these
circumstances. For Anscombe’s view of the matter see her (1981a). I thank Juan Piñeros
Glasscock for some discussion of this.
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to dash away; and if you say you’re going to stop me from going on a walk in the
morning and then we both oversleep, then while you didn’t do what you said
you would it’s not because I managed to go for a walk despite you. On the other
hand, there is some pressure to take a different view about the corresponding
expressions of intention, due to the way that deliberation about one’s own ac-
tions can require taking a stand on one side or the other. For example, if you
ask me whether I’m going a party then the answer “I don’t know; I might or I
might not” can only mean that I am so far undecided—whereas when the time
comes to leave, if I don’t say that I’ll go it can only be because I’ve decided
not to. Could we leverage this observation into an argument that the forms
INT(p) and INT(~p) are like EST(p) and EST(~p) in being both exclusive and
exhaustive?
In fact the point fails to generalize—and this is good news, since the posi-
tion it would yield is formally inconsistent.17 Think, for example, of a parent
considering whether to tell her child to put away their dishes. The parent can
refrain from giving the child this instruction but also refrain from telling the
child to leave the dishes where they are: that is, she may simply wait to see
what they do. Likewise, my own deliberation over whether to wake up early to
exercise may conclude with the decision to wait and see what happens: I won’t
set an alarm, but nor have I said I’ll sleep in late. In general, then, it’s possible
for both members of the pair INT(p) and INT(~p) to be false at once. They
are related in the manner of Aristotelian contraries, as shown in Table 3.
INT(p) INT(~p) EST(p) EST(~p)
INT(p) T F T FF T or F T or F T or F
INT(~p) T F F TF T or F T or F T or F
EST(p) T T or F F FF F T or F T
EST(~p) T F T or F FF T or F F T
Table 3: Truth-table for the statements INT(p), INT(~p), EST(p), and
EST(~p).
17A demonstration of the formal inconsistency can be left to a footnote. Suppose for reductio
that (i) EST(p) and EST(~p) are Aristotelian contradictories; (ii) EST(p) is the subaltern
of INT(p); and (iii) INT(p) and INT(~p) are Aristotelian contradictories. Now let INT(p)
be false. By (iii), it follows that INT(~p) is true, from which it follows by (ii) that EST(~p)
is true, from which it follows by (i) that EST(p) is true. And this contradicts what we said
above, that since EST(p) is the subaltern of INT(p) it should be possible for INT(p) to be




It is widely understood that Anscombe’s defense of the possibility of non-
observational knowledge of one’s actions turns on her claim that this knowledge
is practical rather than contemplative:
Certainly in modern philosophy we have an incorrigibly contempla-
tive conception of knowledge. Knowledge must be something that
is judged as such by being in accordance with the facts. The facts,
reality, are prior, and dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge.
And this is the explanation of the utter darkness in which we found
ourselves. For if there are two knowledges—one by observation, the
other in intention—then it looks as if there must be two objects of
knowledge; but if one says the objects are the same, one looks hope-
lessly for the different mode of contemplative knowledge in acting,
as if there were a very queer and special sort of seeing eye in the
middle of the acting. (I, p. 57)
My aim in this chapter has been to undermine an interpretation of Anscombe’s
position on which her denial that practical knowledge “is judged as such by being
in accordance with the facts” is an invitation to think that discordance between
practial thinking and the fact of what happens is no threat to the truth of that
thinking. If this were what Anscombean “practical truth” amounted to then its
object would not be what Anscombe consistently claims it is—namely, a process
in the physical world that can also be known by observation to a third party.
The difference between practical and theoretical knowledge is not a difference in
what each is knowledge of, but rather in the logical form of the considerations
that ground them.
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